A sovereign submarine capability in Australia’s grand strategy by Paul Dibb
 
Strategic & Defence Studies Centre 
ANU College of Asia & the Pacific  
The Australian National University 
A SOVEREIGN SUBMARINE 
CAPABILITY IN AUSTRALIA’S 
GRAND STRATEGY 
Paul Dibb 
Emeritus Professor of Strategic Studies 




   OF GRAVITY  
                                SEriES
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Paul Dibb is Emeritus Professor of Strategic Studies at The Australian 
National University where he was head of the Strategic and Defence 
Studies Centre from 1991 to 2003. His previous positions include: 
Deputy Secretary of the Department of Defence, Director of the Defence 
Intelligence Organisation, and Head of the National Assessments Staff 
(National Intelligence Committee).
He is the author of 5 books and more than 130 academic articles and 
monographs about the global strategic outlook, the security of the Asia-
Pacific region, the US alliance, and Australia’s defence policy. He wrote 
the 1986 Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities (the Dibb Report) 
and was the primary author of the 1987 Defence White Paper. His book 
The Soviet Union: the Incomplete Superpower was published in 1986 by 
the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. 
He was made a member of the Order of Australia in 1989 for his 
contribution to Australia’s defence policy and intelligence work. During 
the Howard Government, he was a member of the Foreign Minister’s 
Foreign Policy Council. He has represented Australia at six meetings of 
the ASEAN Regional Forum’s Experts and Eminent Persons Group since 
2006.
ABOUT THE SERIES
The Centre of Gravity series is the flagship publication of the Strategic 
and Defence Studies Centre (SDSC) based at The Australian National 
University’s College of Asia and the Pacific. The series aspires to provide 
high quality analysis and to generate debate on strategic policy issues 
of direct relevance to Australia. Centre of Gravity papers are 1,500-
2,000 words in length and are written for a policy audience. Consistent 
with this, each Centre of Gravity paper includes at least one policy 
recommendation. Papers are commissioned by SDSC and appearance in 
the series is by invitation only. SDSC commissions up to 10 papers in any 
given year.  
 
Further information is available from the Centre of Gravity series editor 
Dr Andrew Carr (andrew.carr@anu.edu.au).
Centre of Gravity series paper #3
Cover Photo, of the HMAS Dechaineux, courtesy of The Royal Australian Navy  
http://www.flickr.com/photos/royal_australian_navy/6345225431/sizes/o/in/set-72157624000143065/   
 
© 2012 ANU Strategic and Defence Studies Centre. All rights reserved.
The Australian National University does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented here are the 
author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the University, its staff, or its trustees.
No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without permission in writing from 
the ANU Strategic and Defence Studies Centre. Please direct inquiries to andrew.carr@anu.edu.au  
This publication can be downloaded for free at http://ips.cap.anu.edu.au/sdsc/
ANU College of Asia & the Pacific 1
My aim in this paper is to describe what I consider to be the principal policy issues, both military and non-military, surrounding the decisions to be made about Australia’s future submarine. I shall begin with a description of Australia’s strategic outlook and 
its implications for our future force structure and then turn to the key defence, political and 
economic considerations involved. 
 
AUSTRALIA’S STRATEGIC OUTLOOK AND FORCE STRUCTURE PRIORITIES
Given our geography, Australia’s future security will be inextricably linked to what happens 
as the global balance of economic and military power moves decisively to Asia. This means 
that next year’s Defence White Paper needs to be a post-Afghanistan policy document, which 
spells out clearly that our defence focus must now shift to our own region of primary strategic 
concern. 
That means a distinct move away from expeditionary forces in the Middle East and a renewed 
focus on the demands of operating principally in a maritime environment in a part of the 
world where increasingly sophisticated naval and air forces will operate. This is not to drum 
up the prospect of a direct military threat by a major power to Australia’s security, as some 
commentators would have it. We need to focus on managing the peace as the regional balance 
of power shifts, but we also need to hedge our bets by financing a technologically advanced 
ADF. 
Of course, we have a deep interest in avoiding armed conflict. However, history is littered with 
misjudgements about what happens when the balance of power fundamentally shifts in a 
strategic environment where arms races are occurring. As the Australia in the Asian Century 
White Paper notes, the risk of mistakes and misadventure remains high in our region.
This means having a potent submarine force that is better than most in the region and capable 
of independent Australian military operations. It also means building and maintaining in 
Australia through their expected 30-year life the most complicated platforms in the Defence 
Force. The majority of the costs of the new submarines will not be their acquisition but their 
through-life operating costs and maintenance. 
Too many players, especially in Defence, have lost sight of the centrality of Australian sovereign independence when framing Australian defence priorities. This is a consequence of operating in a subordinate role to our great American ally over the last 
decade. Defence self-reliance for Australia does not mean doing everything ourselves, but for 
submarines it does mean having the domestic ability to use foreign intellectual property in 
undertaking our own through-life support and indigenous modifications.
The primary justification for a new submarine is its deterrent capacity because it is difficult to 
locate and fundamentally threaten enemy maritime operations. In my view, the central defining 
feature of our Future Submarine and the key to its operational superiority over other regional 
powers will be the high probability that it will have an evolvement of the US Virginia-class 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
• Australia needs a post-Afghanistan  defence strategy.
• Tight fiscal conditions are here for the medium term, so defence priorities need to be 
challenged. 
• A conventional submarine capacity of at least six to nine provides the best option for 
Australian security. 
POLICY RECOMMENDATION 
Submarines are Australia’s most important strategic asset. Our future submarines will need 
long range and endurance and, if we are to retain a clear war-fighting advantage, they should 
be equipped with a US combat system and weapons. Nuclear submarines are not a credible 
option for Australia 
The Centre of Gravity Series2
combat system (AN/BYG-1(V) 8) and very advanced US weapons such as the ADCAP Mark 
48 torpedo. We are the only other country in the world to operate such highly sensitive 
US combat capabilities already on the Collins class. This feature alone will very much 
determine what type of future submarine we acquire and where it will be built.
A new submarine may also provide strategic strike capability as a hedge against longer 
term strategic uncertainty. While the stealthy Joint Strike Fighter will deliver a potent and 
survivable strike capability with precision stand-off missiles and supported by AEW&C and 
tanker aircraft, the 2009 Defence White Paper stated that the Government places a priority 
on broadening our strategic strike options.  
 
This will occur through the acquisition of maritime-based land-attack cruise missiles, fitted 
to the air-warfare destroyers, the future frigate and the future submarine.  
THE REALITY OF ECONOMIC STRINGENCY 
However, we need to recognise that we are probably in for a prolonged period of economic 
stringency. The Secretary of Treasury has made it plain that there is a structural and 
demographic challenge ahead of us. It is highly probable – whichever government we 
have in power over the next several years – that the Defence Budget will continue to be 
under severe constraints. It has also been the case historically that after previous long and 
expensive wars – including in Korea and Vietnam – the Australian Defence Force has been 
reduced in size.
Thus, having no money will force a certain realism on the drafters of the new Defence 
White Paper. The simple fact is that the force structure proposed in the 2009 Rudd white 
paper is no longer affordable. That means that some Single Service major projects will 
have to be axed or moved out to the never-never. By far the most expensive projects 
in the current Defence Capability Plan are the Future 
Submarines with acquisition costs of about $25 billion, 
the Joint Strike Fighters for at least $16 billion, and the 
replacement of Army’s armoured combat vehicle fleet for 
$19 billion. For my money, the land combat vehicle bid 
is of lower strategic importance and more amenable to 
reconsideration.
Although I am a strong proponent of the Future 
Submarines, the fact is that there is no strategic 
justification as to why we have suddenly decided to 
double our submarine force from six to 12, other than 
at the whim of former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd. I do 
not believe that we should conjure up the number 
of submarines we require based on highly unlikely 
scenarios of war with a major power adversary – namely 
China – which we would attack with Tomahawk cruise missiles.1 I would expect the new 
Defence white paper to move away from that sort of highly provocative language and to 
acknowledge that nuclear deterrence and the intensity of economic interdependence in 
Asia does put a brake on the potentiality for major power conflict.
However, I accept that there will probably be crucial classified advice going to the Government setting out credible contingencies, short of major power war, and deriving figures for the number of operational submarines we might prefer. For 
example, if we need two submarines continuously on patrol in our northern approaches 
this would result in an overall submarine fleet size of at least 6 submarines – depending 
upon the availability ratios used for modern submarine maintenance. If, instead, we opted 
for having two submarines available for operations in the eastern Indian Ocean and the 
South China Sea and also at least one on patrol in our northern waters a fleet size of nine 
submarines would be suggested.
“There is no strategic 
justification as to why we 
have suddenly decided 
to double our submarine 
force from 6 to 12.” 
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In any event, we need to recognise that in our current, and likely future, straitened economic 
circumstances money is not a free good. Projects such as the Future Submarines cost anywhere 
from, say, $1 billion each for a European design or anywhere from $2 to $3 billion each for an 
evolved Collins or a new design.
This means that those who are calling for Australia to spend between three and four per cent 
of GDP on defence are being unrealistic. The strategic drivers are simply not there, and the 
financial pressures are too severe. It would mean spending an additional $25 billion to $40 
billion on defence compared with the $24 billion spent under the current defence budget. Out 
of whose hide would this sort of money come? Take your choice – schools and universities, 
hospitals, aged and disability care, or national infrastructure such as roads and rail.
THE NATIONAL INTEREST AND SUBMARINES
I recognise that there are some broader national interest issues to consider when we are 
considering such issues as the future of naval shipbuilding in Australia. This is a contentious 
subject. Proponents on one side claim that it is in the national interest to have a naval 
shipbuilding industry and those on the other side assert that this will only lead to a waste of 
taxpayers’ money, huge subsidies and wasteful economic protectionism.2
Both the Government and the Opposition have affirmed that the Future Submarines will be 
built in Australia and assembled in Adelaide. What has not yet been determined is whether 
we go for a European military off-the-shelf solution, 
modified or not, an evolved Collins class or even a 
new design. My view is that an evolved Collins is the 
more likely, but we shall see. 
It is, however, important that we have a rigorous 
debate about whether we can have a viable naval 
shipbuilding industry in Australia and what the 
real costs and benefits are. The future of naval 
shipbuilding in Australia – including building the 
future submarines, new frigates and offshore patrol 
vessels – could involve building costs of at least $40 
billion, according to ASPI.3 
What is needed is an independent analysis of 
the impact of such spending on Australia’s gross 
domestic product, our skills and employment base 
and the multiplier effects of innovation. And subjecting it all to careful  
cost-benefit analysis. If the naval shipbuilding industry is to be sustained into the future it will 
need to manage the production workloads, so that there are not the peaks and troughs that 
have led in the past to the running down of scarce skills only to ramp them up again when a 
new burst of shipbuilding is required.  
There is another matter of national security interest that I need to raise. And that is the issue of whether we should purchase nuclear attack submarines from the United States. I note that neither the Government nor the Opposition favour this course, but some 
individuals on both sides of politics apparently do. 
My understanding is that at the highest levels the US has indicated very firmly to us that they 
prefer Australia to have quiet conventional submarines that can go places and do things that 
large nuclear submarines cannot do so easily. That was certainly the case in my experience as 
director of defence intelligence in the Cold War.
Moreover, from Australia’s security perspective the fact that we have no experience with 
nuclear propulsion means that we would be totally dependent on the US for their regular 
maintenance. This could be a big problem if we ever wanted to use these submarines in a 
regional conflict where Australian and US interests were not aligned.  
“The US has indicated 
very firmly to us that 
they prefer Australia 
to have conventional 
submarines.” 
The Centre of Gravity Series4
POLICY RECOMMENDATION 
Submarines are Australia’s most important strategic asset. Our future submarines will need 
long range and endurance and, if we are to retain a clear war-fighting advantage, they 
should be equipped with a US combat system and weapons.  Nuclear submarines are not a 
credible option for Australia. 
Endnotes
1. The white paper, Australia in the Asian Century (2012), does not see major power conflict in our   
 region as likely (see page 227). 
2. Here I must register a potential conflict of interest because I am an adviser to the South Australian  
 Government’s defence advisory board. 
3. Davies, Andrew, Ergas, Henry and Thomson, Mark (2012) Should Australia build warships? An   
 economic and strategic analysis Australian Strategic and Policy Institute 1February 2012 p.5.  
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The US Ambassador has observed that we don’t even have a nuclear energy program in 
Australia and unless we get that kind of infrastructure, “it’s very, very difficult to maintain any 
sort of other nuclear industries”.4 It is, in any case, simplistic to believe that the US would simply 
hand over sensitive nuclear military knowledge, even to its closest ally.
SOME CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
The last decade involved large-scale US ground force interventions in the Middle East that were 
aberrations because they were born of temporary necessity.5 Now the strategic driver of US 
defence policy, and our own, is the shift in the world balance of power to Asia. In our case, this 
means that our force structure and operational priorities will revert to our own region. 
Australia’s defence strategy is now principally a maritime one. We need submarines to defend 
our approaches, sustain a maritime presence in our region, to be able to sink other submarines 
and surface ships, and undertake certain strategic missions where stealth and endurance will 
be crucial, as well as having new strike capabilities – if that option is pursued. 
Irrespective of which submarine we acquire it will have one of the world’s most advanced US 
combat systems and weapons, which will assure us of a critical operational advantage. This will 
largely determine the type of submarine we acquire, where we acquire it from, and the task of 
integrating highly sensitive US equipment. 
Very few nations in the world can build advanced modern submarines and Australia now has 
substantial experience in doing that. To be credible, however, Australia needs as much control 
as possible over its next submarine-building program, while recognising it will require overseas 
assistance in the design phase. 
This will be a demanding nation-building project and it will require evidence that we have 
learnt from the lessons of Collins. The Future Submarine project will undoubtedly test industry’s 
capacity to deliver. But – and let me stress this – the bottom line is that we need a submarine 
that is capable of supporting a posture of defence self-reliance and our requirement for 
independent submarine operations.
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